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to the decision of the World Court will not set a precedent to be
followed by other nations against whom decisions are rendered. It
is almost too obvious to warrant mention that if it became a prac-
tice for countries to threaten or take retalliatory action against
countries who have judges on the court or counsel arguing before
the court, it's efficacy would be sharply curtailed. The judicial ob-
jectivity of the court could rapidly give way to politically inspired
decisions designed to curry favor with one of the parties to a dis-
pute. Under the present set-up there is little which can be done to
prevent this type of action and it can only be hoped that other
countries accepting the jurisdiction of the court will avoid using
political pressures to influence the court or to retalliate for unfavor-
able decisions.9
DAMAGES - PERSONAL INJURIES - PER DIEM
ARGUMENT TO BE ALLOWED
In an action for damages for bodily injuries, the trial court re-
fused to allow plaintiff's counsel to suggest a per diem argument
to the jury on the elements of past and future pain and suffering.
On appeal, seeking a reversal and remand for a new trial on the
issue of damages only, Held: Inasmuch as both the total amount
claimed and the plaintiff's life expectancy may be argued in Colo-
rado, so also may counsel illustrate the mathematical process of
computing the gross amount sought for pain and suffering by re-
ducing it to the units by which it is endured, i.e., segments of time.
Newbury v. Vogel, 15 Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sh. 11 (1963).
The propriety of using a per diem or time segment theory in
counsel's closing argument was of first impression in the principal
case, although it has been the subject of decision and discussion in
9 Keeping in mind Thailand's reaction to this decision the recent suggestion that World Court
judges should be mode world citizens rather than citizens of individual countries assumes new
meaning and it is possible that in the future this will be the most desirable step to take to
avoid the perils to the efficacy of the court seen by the author as a result of actions such as
those token by Thailand. The world citizenship proposal has been advanced in a preliminary
draft plan for changes in the International Court of Justice submitted by Eberhard P. Deutsch to
the American Bar Association Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations.
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numerous other jurisdictions.' The authorities appear to be divided
among (1) those who hold the argument is proper;- (2) those who
declare it to be a matter within the discretion of the trial court;
:'
and (3) those who refuse to allow it.
4
Pennsylvania has stood opposed to any argument equating dol-
lars with pain and suffering since 1891.; Most of the jurisdictions,
however, which have refused to allow use of the per diem argument
rely on recent decisions in which the courts have held that such
arguments have no foundation in evidence and invade the province
of the jury.6
Those in opposition have also stressed that defendant's counsel,
in attempting to mitigate such evaluations, necessarily lends sup-
port to plaintiff's implication that pain and suffering may be given
a precise value 7 and that intensity of pain must vary.s It is urged
that such arguments would lead to "monstrous" verdicts,9 would
mislead the jury, 0 and might, if reduced to a logical conclusion,
result in evaluating pain and suffering at a "penny per heartbeat,"
or the like. 1 There are at least nine jurisdictions which categorical-
ly refuse to allow per diem argument. on these and other grounds.1'
2
Those jurisdictions which have either held the argument to be
proper, or to be within the discretion of the trial court, rely heavily
on Ratner v. Arrington,' a 1959 Florida case, in which the court
rhetorically asked why, if it is proper to argue for a given total,
is it not likewise proper to illustrate how the plaintiff arrived at
that figure.
Of those jurisdictions which have considered the point, at least
eleven have left it within the discretion of the trial court,' 4 and at
least the same number have simply allowed it, albeit with some
I Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958, Supp. 1960, 1962, 1963).
2 Newbury v. Vogel, 15 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 11 (1963); Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App.2d
323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961), later overruled in Coley v. Manicke, 24 111.2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206
(1962); Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Bone, 180 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. 1962); Corkery v.
Greenberg, 114 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1962); Eastern Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md.
411, 177 A.2d 701 (1962), off'd, 180 A.2d 681 (Md. 1962); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109
N.W.2d 828 (1961); Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); Hernandez v. Baucum,
344 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1961); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575
(1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash.2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960); Evening Star Newspaper Co. v.
Gray, 179 A.2d 377 (D.D.C. 1962).
2McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d
82 (Fla. 1959); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Little v. Hughes,
136 So. 2d 448 (La. 1961); Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633
(1958); 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); Johnson v.
Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509
(N.D. 1961); Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio 1961); J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler,
231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex, 1950); Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1961).
4 Henne v. Bolick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Caley v. Manicke, 24 lll.2d 390, 182
N.E.2d 206 (1962); Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d
873 (1955); Goldstein v Fendelman, 336 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1960); Chamberlain v. Palmer Lumber,
104 N.H. 221, 183 A.2d 906 (1962); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Stassun v.
Chopin, 324 Pa. 127, 188 AtI. 111 (1936); Certified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Horrington, 201 Va.
109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959); Armstead v. Holbert, 122 S.E.2d 43 (W. Va. 1961); Affett v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
5 Stassun v. Chopin, 324 Pa. 127, 188 AtI. 111 (1936).
6 Chamberlain v. Palmer Lumber, Inc., 104 N.H. 221, 183 A.2d 9C6 (1962); Botta v. Brunner,
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Certified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109
S.E.2d 126 (1959).
7 Botta e. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955); Cer-
tified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959); Affett v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
! Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955).
10 Ibid.; See also Chamberlain v. Palmer Lumber, 104 N.H. 221, 183 A.2d 906 (1962).
11 Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.. 11 Wis.2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
12 See note 4 supra.
1.3 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959).
14 See note 3 supro.
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qualifications. ' Both of these groups have pointed out that juries
might spontaneously strike upon the method, and that counsel
should therefore not be prohibited from suggesting it.16 They also
note that the very lack of any standard of value argues for latitude
in discussions of pain and suffering as elements of damages, 7 and
that argument in mitigation may be made without implying an
admission of liability, for as defendants must now attempt to miti-
gate the plaintiff's lump-sum claim, the need to mitigate component
claims will impose no undue hardships.' It has even been noted
that juries are likely to regard such arguments as "lawyer talk,"
and that as courts customarily instruct that such arguments are
not to be considered as evidence, excessive verdicts will not neces-
sarily follow.19
It may be seen that of the thirty-one jurisdictions here considered,
two-thirds of these will, under some circumstances at least, allow
the per diem argument, usually requiring the trial court to caution
the jury as to the weight to be given the argument .20 These courts
have allowed counsel to break the time segments down to units of
weeks, 21 days,'2 2 or even hours.2 3 Nor has the per diem illustration
been restricted to closing argument, e.g., Mississippi allows it to be
used in counsel's opening statement.
24
Colorado counsel have for many years used the per diem meth-
od of argument as to the elements of past and future pain and suf-
fering, and it is significant that the principal case represents the
first time that it has been deemed a subject fit for appellate review.
Here, as in the law of contracts, silence would seem to have been
acceptance of its propriety, at least as being within the discretion
of the trial court. Colorado has now moved in the direction of sev-
eral of her sister states25 in removing it from the realm of the trial
court's discretion and giving it categorical approval. This is an
enlightened view, appreciating the argument for what it is, merely
a course of reasoning as is any other argument on the elements
of pain and suffering.
It will be of interest to note the effect of the principal case. as
Colorado is not presently considered a "high verdict state,"'26 and in
some quarters is even regarded as being somewhat penurious. The
Colorado plaintiff is now guaranteed the opportunity to argue and
illustrate his process of evaluating pain and suffering, unfettered
by judicial apron-strings.
PAUL S. GOLDMAN
15 See note 2 supra.
16 Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1959).
17 Caley v. Manicke, 29 III. App.2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24,
169 A.2d 661 (1961).
IS Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App.2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961).
19 Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Bone, 180 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. 1962); Yates v. Wenk,
363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961).
20 McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958); Little v. Hughes, 136 So. 2d 448
(La. 1961); Eastern Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 177 A.2d 701 (1962); Boutang
v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins.
Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash.2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960);
Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d (D.D.C. 1962).
21 Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961).
22 See note 13 supra.
23 Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Bone, 180 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. 1962); Little v. Hughes,
136 So. 2d 448 (La. 1961); Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio 1961).
24 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954).
25 Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs,
325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1959).
266 Defense L.J. 379 (1959).
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